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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MAUDE BAKER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7239

L. JANSEN, doing business as UTAH
HOUSE CLEANING COMP'ANY,
Defendant and App,ellarnt.

APPELLANT '~S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendants S•tanley D. Decker and L. Jansen, doing business as Utah House Cleaning Comp,any, for damages
alleged to have resulted to her on the morning of January 29, 1946, from a fall while she was walking along
the second story hallway of the Roosevelt Apartments
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Th·e case was tried before a
jury and at •the close of plaintiff's case a motion for
nonsuit was grante:d in favor of the defendant, Stanley
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D. Decker. (R,. 106) After the parties had introduced
their evidence and rested, the trial eourt denied the.
the motion of the defendant, L. Jansen, for a direeted
verdict, and the case was submitted to the jury. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against
the defendant, L. Jansen, and it is from this verdict
and the judgment which was entered that defendant
ap,peals.
The Roosevelt Apartment House is a three-story
building facing north on Third South Street in Salt
Lake City. There is a driveway on the east side of the
building which leads from the street to garages at the
rear of 'the building. Each of the three floors has a
hallway running north and south the full length of the
building. There are three stairways in the building,
one in front, one in back and one on the east side. These
stairways -connect the three floors each with the other,
thereby allowing traverse of the floor above or below
from any stairway. Mter deseending to the main floor
'level, the front or north stairway continues to the front
entrance, the ·east stairway eontinues to an alleyway
entrance, and the back or south stairway eontinues to
'the back entrance. Mrs. Baker lived in Apartment 212,
which is the second apartment from the south end of
the building on th·e east side of the second floor. (R.
90-93, Exhibit 5)
The defendant L. Jansen, doing business as Utah
House Cleaning Company, was engaged in the business
of painting, papering and housecleaning. He had enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tered into a contract with the defendant, Stanley D.
Decker, the ovvner of the Roosevelt Apartments, to paint
the wood,vork, :p1aper the ceilings and walls of the halls
and stair,vays and wash the wainscoting on the lower
walls of said ap~artment hous-e. He began work fou.r or
five days prior to the 29th of January and had completed the top floor and all of the second floor eX!cept
the north part of the hallway and front stairway. (R.
111-112) At 8:00 o'clock on the morning of the 29th,
he and his help~er, Leonard V ermaas, set up •their equip'""
ment in the north p·art of the second floor hallway. ;This
equipment consisted of a canvas drop cloth, a p~ap;ering
table, a tool box and a ll'aste bucket. (R. 112-113) The
canvas was twelve feet long, folded to make a three-foot
width and placed under the table to receive the strips
of paper after the paper had been trimm·ed. (R. 113,
131) The table was seven feet long, three f.eet wide
and three feet high (R. 130) and p~laced on top of the
canvas and flush against the east wall of the hallway
(R. 114) north of the east s•tairway. The tool box was
eighteen inches wide by eighteen inches high (R. 129)
and placed op·posite the south end of the table from
two to six inches east of the west wall. The p~aste
bucket was ten inches high and· placed on 'top' of the tool
box with a six inch brush in a holder in the bucket.
(R. 115, 129, 146, 160) A 100-watt ·electric light was
hanging directly. over the :p1apering 'table about one foot
down from the ceiling, secured by means of an ·extension
cord wrapped around the ceiling light fix•ture and
plugged into an outlet on the east wall under the table.
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(R. 151, 152) Another 100-watt light in a floor lamp
without a shade was located at the no:rth stairway on
the second floor where Mr. Jansen and his helper, Mr.
Vermaas, were working. There were three stationary
lights in the hall and one over each stairway. The hallway of the second floor was 5 feet 2 inches in width.
It was 28 feet 6 inches from Mrs. Baker's apartment
south to the back stairway (R. 127), 56 feet from her·
apartment north to the east stairway (R. 128), 22 feet
north from the eas't stairway to the table (R. 127, Exhibit 5) and about 180 feet 'long from the south stairway
to the north stairway. (R. 186) .· The front stairway
on the morning of the accident was blocked by a plank
between 'two ladders. ( R. 115, 143, 155) ·
On the morning in question the plaintiff left her
apartment at about ten minutes to nine o'clock to go to
her place of ·employment at the Communi'ty Chest office.
As she came into the hall she noticed the paper hanger's
table along the east wall, the canvas underneath the
table and the container or bucket to the west of the
table near the west wall and opposite the south end of
the table. (R. 84, 93-97, 190-192) The two 100-watt
lights, the stairway light and the center light in the hall
were burning. She did not recall seeing the tool chest
nor did she remember seeing the men, but she either
observed them or heard their voices for she knew they
w·ere there. She noticed that the canvas was spread
out covering the carpet, (R. 95) uneven, crumpled and
bunched at the end of the table. (R. 191) She observed this condition of the canvas and the location of
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the bucket and table :before she attempted to walk
throug·h the space bet,veen the bucket and the table and
to step over the canvas. (R. 192). She stepped over
the canvas 'vith her left foot, caught her right hee'l in
it and fell. She fell between the table and the west wall
with her head to the north. (R. 98) The defendant
~Ir. Jansen and Mr. \T ermaas ran to her imme-diately,
and after a few minutes carried her to her apartment.
STATEMENT O·F ERRORS.
1. The trial court erred in overruling the general
demurrer of the defendant, L. Jansen, to the plaintiff's
amended complaint. (R. 15)
The trial court erred In failing to grant the
motion of the defendant, L. Jansen, for a nonsuit.
(R. 24 and 106-7)
2.

The trial court erred in failing to direct the
jury to return a verdict for the defendant, L. Jansen.
(R. 25, 39, 194-5 and 197)
3.

4. The tri·a;l court erred in giving Instruction No.
5 as follows.:
''You are instructed that if the defendant,
L. Jansen, and his em:pJoyees, while performing
their work in the hallway on the second floor
of the Roosevelt Apartments, knew or should
have known that it would not be reasonably
safe for persons using said hallway to cross
over the canvas or pass their equipment, then
it was the duty of said defendant or his emSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ployees either to block off said hallway where
they were working or to instruct and advise persons using the same to use the other stairway; and if you find from the evidence that
ithey failed in this duty and that hy reason
thereof plaintiff, while using ordinary care for
her own safety, was injured, 'then your verdict
shall he in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant." (R. 32 and 199-200)
5. The trial court erred in giving written Instruction No. 4 as follows :
''You are instructed that it was the duty
of the defendant, L.. Jan sen, and his employees
to keep the floor of the hallway on ·the second
floor of the apartment building reasonably safe
for plaintiff in her use of the hallway, and
that if the said defendant in spreading canvas
on the floor or in permitting tools and equipment to be left and strewn about the hallway in
such a manner as to make the hallway dangerous, or not reasonably safe for the 'p1laintiff in
her use thereof, then 'the said defendant was
negligep_t." (R. 31-2 and 198-9)
and in giving orally as part of Instruction No. 4, then
striking the same from the written instruction, the following:
''And if you find that in exercising ordinary care for her own safety, plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the def-endant, if
you find ~that the defendant was negligent, then
your verdict should he for the p~laintiff and
against the defendant Jan sen.'' ( R. 32' and
198-9)
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6.

The trial court erred in giving that part of In-

struction No. 8 defining "negligence."
200)

(R. 33-4 and

The trial court erred in giving Instruction No.

7.

10 on the measure of ·damages.

(R. 34-5 and 200)

8. The trial court erre·d in refusing to give the defendant, L. Jansen's requested instruction No. 6 as
follO"\VS:
"You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in
traversing the hallway of the apartment was
not relieved of the necessity ·of exercising ordinary care for her own safety. If you find that
the defendant's equipment was placed in the
hallway in such a manner tha't it constituted a
hazard which p~laintiff unde-r the circumstances
should have observed and that plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that other exits were
available to her, p·roceeded 'to take the hazardous course, then you must find that she assumed the risk of any injury which she sustained and your ve~rdict shall he in favor of the
defendant Jansen, no cause of action." (R. 45
and 197-8)
9.

The trial court erred in refusing to g1ve the

defendant L. Jans·en's requested instruction No. 8, as

r
[
n
0

a

follows:
"If you find that the defendant's equipment was placed in the hallway in such a manner that it constituted a hazard and that plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tiff observed, or in the exercise of ordinary
care should have observed such hazard, then
you are ins'tructed that plaintiff was negligent
in not taking either the east or south stairways.
which were available to her and your verdict
shall be against the P'laintiff and in favor of
. "
the defendant Jansen, no eause o f act Ion.
(R. 47 and 198)
10. The tria:l court erred in refusing to give the
defendant L. Jansen's requested instruction No. 9, as
follows:
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in
traversing the hallway of the apartment is not
relieved of the necessity ·of ·exercising ordinary
care for her own safety regardless of whether
the equipmen't of the defendant was so placed
in the· hallway that it did or ·did not constitute
a hazard. 'Therefore, if you believe from all
of the evidence that plain tiff acted in a careless
or n·egligent manner in passing by or over 'the
equipment and that such carelessness or negligence resulted in the injury complained of, your
verdict shall he in favor of the defendant L.
Jan sen, no cause of action.'' (R. 48 and 198)
11.

The trial court erred in overruling the motion

of defendant, L. Jansen, for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict of the jury. (R. 26, 6-3 and 204)
12. The trial court erred in overruling ·defendant,
L. Jansen's motion for new trial. (R.. 56-7, 63, 66-8 and
203-6)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I.

THE COURT ER.RED IN OVERRULING
DEFENDANT, L. JANSEN'S GENERAL
D E ~f U RRER TO P L A I N T I F F· ' S
AMENDED COJVIPL·AIN:T.

Plaintiff :pileads facts in her complaint apiparently
known to her and observed by her. Th,e part of he:r
complaint alleging the condition of the hallway and
charging the defendants with negligence reads as follows:

"4. That on the second floor there is a
hallway extending from the fron't to the rear
of said floor with a stairway leading to the
first floor at each end of said hallway.
"5. That on the 29th day of January,
1946, while said defendants were papering or
cleaning the hallway on the second floor of said
apartment building, said defendants were negligent and careless in the following particulars,
to-wit:
"(a) That the cloth and covering put up
on [sic] the floor to protect the same was laid
or permitted to become ruffled and uneven, so
that ~people traversing said hallway across and
over said covering might catch their feet in the
same and fall.
'' (b)

That said defendants negligently and
carel~ssly pernritte·d their too'ls an·d equipmen't
to become stre'vn in said hallway so that they
would be a hazard to people walking down said
h·a.llway.
'' (c)' That the defendants failed and negleeted to advis~e and warn individuals using said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hallway, and particularly their tenants and s~d
plaintiff, that they should not walk a'long s·aid
passage.
" (d) That the· defendants failed and neglec~t:ed to place barricade or signs across said
hallway so that tenants and other people would
be warned not to use said hallway and permitted
people to traverse back and forth along said
hallway.
'' 6. That by reason of the careless and
negligent acts aforesaid and as the sole and
proximate cause thereof, plaintiff, while proceeding along said hallway and wnaw,are of the
fact that same was not open to use, caught her·
foot in said cloth or stumbled over the equipment of the defendants, which caused her to
fall. * * * '' (Italics ours).
No claim is made that the hallway was not sufficiently lighted nor that plaintiff was in any manner
unable to see the ruffled and uneven canvas and the
tools and equipment. Although the canvas, tools and
equipment in the hall hy any reading of the complaint
in fact constituted a barricade and a warning, plaintiff, heeause she was "unaware" of the fact that the
same was not open to use, "·caught her foot in said cloth
or stumbled over the equipment.'' It is doubtful that the
·complaint S'ta.tes facts sufficient to show culpable negligence against the defendant, Jansen, as the .condition
of the hallway as alleged does not show that a hazard
existed. If the complaint could he construed to allege
a hazardous condition, plaintiff cannot be heard to say
that she was unaware of such condition when it was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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open and obvious, and she does not allege facts showing a reason for her inability to observe it. It is further
apparent that plaintiff did not have to subject herself to
the alleged hazard, for, as she states, there wa.s a stair\Yay leading to the first floor at each end of the hallway
and plaintiff does not allege that the hallway was hazardous in all of the directions available to her.
POINT II.

THE DEFENDANT L. JANSEN OR HIS
EMPLO·YEES WERE NOT 'GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE.

The defendant, L. Jansen, was eharged with p·utting
the canvas on the floor of the hallway and permitting
it to become ruffled and uneven, vvith permitting tools
and equipment to hecome strewn in the hallway, and
with failing to :P'lace a barricade or signs or to otherwise
warn against the use of the hailway. At the close of
plaintiff's case the plaintiff herself had tesitified as to
the location and condition of the ·equipment a.s follows:

''Q.

Now, will you describe just what happened
as you left your a·partment~

A.

As I came out in the hall, I noticed the cleaning there and started out the usual way, but
I did notice that the canvas was rump·led at
that end. I step})ed over, but the right foot
caught either in the hole or bunched canvas,
and the table vvas holding it so that it didn't
give, and I fe'll.

Q.

Now, was there any equipment or anything
in the hallway, or did you notice~
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The table, the pap~er hanger's 'table al~ne
and the canvas, and I don't recall anything
·else that was there.
Q. Do you remember what side of the hall that
was. located on~
A. On the east. ·The table was along the east
wall." * * * (R. 84)
"Q. Now, I believe you stated that as you came
out of your apartment you observed the
paper hangers in the hallway. Is that corA.

rect~

A. I did.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

* * *
Could you state how far that table extended
out from the east wall, ap~p·roximately~
W eil, as I remember, it was against the east
wall.
It was right against the east wall~
Yes.
And then about how far out into the hallway
would it extend~
Oh, the average width of a pap.er hanger's
table. I don't know what that would be. I
don't know whether it would he three feet
or a little less, pro bahly.

Q. About three feet would you say~
A. I should say about that, or less, i.f anything.
I wouldn't be sure.

* * *
Then did you observe that -canvas that you
have mentioned; as you approached the table
· did you iObse.rve the ClaJnVias?
'
A. Yies, I d~id.
Q.
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Q. You -observed the canvas?
.A... Yes.
Q. ..A.nd ·w·here ,,. .as that located~

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

It 'vas spread over the hallway as far as the
end of the table, first end.
That would be the south end of the tahle~
Yes.
The table was running north and south, was
it not~
Yes.
And the canvas came out to the south end of
the table. Is that correct~
That's where I caught my foot, and that was
the end of th·e canvas.

* *
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

*

Now, you say you observed some other equ1p'ment there. Did you observe any other equipment besides the canvas~
It seems to me there was a container against
the other wall up that way. They were
getting ready then, of course, that ·e·arly in
the morning and just putting the things up
there.
There was a container against the other wall.
That would be the west wall of the hallway~
It seems to me there was something standing
along, somewher;e along.
Was. that a bucket~
It would be, I think, a bucket.
You think that was a bucket~
Probably a bucket.
A paste bucket~
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A.

Yes.

* * *
Q. But it was west of the table so it left a very
narrow passageway for you to get between
the bucket and the table. Is that ·correct~
A. Well, it didn't obstruct the passageway.
There was p.len'ty of room. I had no thought
of not being able to get through. The walk
was. wide enough to go through.
Q.

You thought it was wide ·enough to get
through~

A.

Oh, there wasn't anything to make me feel
that there was no room to get by because
there was room to get by.

Q.

Was the bucket west of the table, west of
the south end of the table~
A. Yes, be-cause I wouldn't have noti-ced it-it
was, because I didn't get any farther than
there, so I wouldn't have seen it. It was.
near the other wall or by the other wa'll.

Q. That would be the west wall~
A. Uh huh.'' * * • (R. 93-97)
Regarding the- location of the east stairway and the
south stairway, which were available for plaintiff's use,
Mrs. Baker testified as follows :
Now, as you came out of your ap·artment, I
understand ther·e was a stairway at the south
end of the hall. Is that correct~
A. Yes.

'' Q.

Q.

And you stated that that stairway led out to
the back yard of the apartment~
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.._\.
Q.

.._\.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

That's right.

* * *
No,Y, that stair,vay also led down to the
hall,Yay of the main floor, the first floor, did
it not~
Yes.
And that stairway connected the first and
second floor in addition to making a connection with the rear door of the apartment~
Yes.
And there was just one apartment between
your apartment and that hack stairway. Is
that correct~
Yes.

Now, the stairway on the east side, I believe
you stated that went from the second floor
down to the east alley, to an alleywayA. Yes.
Q. -that was east of the apartment~
A. Yes.
Q. And that stairway also eonnected the hallway
of the sooond floor with the hallway of the
first floor. Is that -correct~
A. Yes.
Q. And then at the front, the front stairway, the
stairway which you testified you were going
toward, that stairway went from th·e second
floor down, from the hallway in the second
floor down to the hallway of the first floor.
Is that correct~
* * *
Q.

A. Yes.
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Q. And where that stairway met the hallway of
the first floor, is that where the front entrance
to the building was~
A.

On the first floor, yes.

Q.

Now, the hallway of the first floor ran the
complete, the full length of the aJpartment
building, did it not~

A.

Yes.

Q.

Just the same

as~the

hallway of the second

floor~

A.

Yes·.''*** (R. 91-93)

Under 'the allegations of the -complaint, p,lantiff was
requir;ed to' show that a hazardous condition ·existed and
that defendant failed to harricade the hallway or otherwise warn plaintiff of its condition. There was no evi·dence that ·defendant's tools and equipment were strewn
in the hallway. The only evidence adduced by plaintiff
on this point was that the table, the eanvas and the
bueket had heen place·d in the hallway. The equipment
described by her was simple and commonplace. ·The evidence did not show that it had heen negligently :placed
in the hallway or that it cons~tituted a hazard. Plaintiff,
in fact, saw every piece of equipment of which she· complains, and observed p~artieularly the canvas before she
stepp.ed over it, and yet she testified: "there wasn't anything to make me feel that there was no room to get by,
because there was room to get by.''
There was no allegation of improper lighting or
of any other condition which would restrict plaintiff's
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ability to see the equipment. As plaintiff saw 'the very
condition complained of and observed the condition of
the ranYas before her fall, a barricade or other warning
would haYe given her no more notice of the condition
than she already had. The testimony, however, shows
that the equipment was set up in such a manner that
it constituted a barricade. All of the evidence shows that
~Ir. Jansen and his helper, Mr. \r ermaas, ~placed a table
3 feet 'vide along the east side of the hall and that a.
bucket was placed on top of a tool box which was near
the west wall of the hallway and west of the south end
of the table. While Mrs. Baker testified that she did not
remember seeing the tool hox, she could not say that i~t
was not there, and she did remember seeing the bucket.
The tool box was 18 inches wide and the over-all h·eight
of the bucket and tool box was 2 feet 4 inches. The hallway was 5 feet 2 inches wide, and simple arithmetic
applied to these facts shows a spaee between the tool
box an·d table to be so narrow that the equipment itself
constituted the barricade which it was intended to be.
Mr. Jansen testified in this regard as follows:

''Q. Did you leave a space there then to go between~

A.

No. It was where we always put it, and we
put that box there as a definite blockade so
nobody will go through.

Q.

In other words, you wanted to block off the
place~

A.

We wanted to block off the whole width of the
hall, yes.
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hall~

Q.

1,he whole ·end of the

A.

Yes, sir." * * * (R. 132-3)'

Mr. Jansen and Mr. V·ermaas testified about other
equipment in the hallway. They described a 100-watt
lamp hanging from the ceiling directly over the table,
a 100-watt light in a floor iamp at the north end of the
hall, and two ladders with a plank betwe·en ~them placed
in such a manner that they blocked the front stairway.
No sign was p~laced on or near the barricade, nor was
Mrs. Baker p~ersonally told not to attem~pt to go through,
but the equipment of which she complains was so simple
and obvious, and when she herself states that she observed it, she cannot claim that she had no warning.
The allegations of the complaint did not state a
~cause of action against the ·defendant, Jansen, and the
evidence introduced in the cas-e fe'll short of showing
actionable negligence on the part of defendant.
POINT III.

THE PLAINTIFF, MRS. BAKER, WAS
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND HAD ASSUMED THE
RIS:K.

Plaintiff in trav-ersing the hallway had 'the duty of
exercising ordinary care for her own safety. If a hazardous condition did not exist then defendant was not
guilty of negligence as previously pointed out. Assuming without admitting that a hazardous condition existed,
plaintiff was still required to use ordinary car;e to ohSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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serve such condition. Her testin1ony clearly establishes
that she knew. the men 'vere working on the second floor,
that she observed the location of the table and bucket
and SR\V the condition of the canvas. We have previously
quoted plaintiff's testimony in chief, and after defendant \Vas required to put on his case, plaintiff was recalled
to the stand and testified as follows:
~ 'Q.

Mrs. Baker, you said the canvas wasn't
folde·d like it is shown in the Exhibit 1 which
~Ir. Richards showed you. Is that correct~
A. That's right, it wasn't folded like that.
1

Did you observe whether it was fotded at all~
A. Well, I couldn't say as to that. I know it
wasn't smooth, and I had to step· over it. It
was uneven, and I felt that it w1as burnche~d
·at the end of the table, though, just crumpled
u.p ·and b11.1nched there, ~and I .wid .s:t!ep over
with my left foot and caught my right heel
in it, and it was held down by the table and
didn't give, and it threw me down.
Q.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

And you

obs~e.rved

that condition befiore you

stepped overI di:d.
-with your left foot~
Well, I was walking right along the hallway
on my way out to go to work as I always do, .
and I had no hesitancy about it because it
seemed perfectly all right, I could step over
that.
You say you observed the bucket there~
Yes, I recall there was a bucket, and it seems
to me it was right against the wall, and I
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can't remember any box whatever, and the
bucket wasn't as a barricade across. I know
that be-cause I wouldn't have pushed the
bucket aside or step~ped over it.
But you do remember the bucket being
thereA. Yes.
Q.

You say you don't recall the tool chest being
over the-re~
A. I can't reca;ll there was a box of any kind.

Q.

It could have been there, and you just not
notice it. Isn't that correct, Mrs. Baker~
A. I wouldn't say there was or wasn't. I didn't! don't have a picture of it in my mind at all.
I defonit:ely have a piclu~e of that bucket as
I just W'alked arownd with p·lenty of ·room,
the t~able arnd the C(J!Y/.AVas ~and the ru.mple:d
p1art of ltlhe oaJYI/Vas. I have 'a very p~Zain pieture in my mind ~about that.

Q.

Q. How high did the bucket app.ear to be, Mrs.
Baker~

A.

W·ell, I couldn't say how high it was. It
wasn't very high. May have been before they
were ready to bring the paste. I don't know.
I just didn't pay at·tention. It had the app·earance of a waste can rath·er than a paste
can. That is what I would say now. I, of
course, wasn't examining it then and thinking about it." ·(R. 190-192) (Italics. ours)·

If ~the evidence could su:p~port a finding that a dangerous condition existed in the hallway, then p~laintiff
was negligent in not discovering it. Plaintiff alleges
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that a hazard existed but does not attempt to ·excuse
herself for not seeing it. She does not allege improper
lighting or any other condition "\vhich would restrict her
ability to see. The equipment was simple and obvious
and if she did not see it, or seeing it did not recognize
it as a hazard, it was because she looked ne·gligently.
In the case of Oswald v. Utah Light arnd R1ailw:ay Com. .
pamy, 39 Utah 245, 117 !Pac. 46, plaintiff and her
daughter, who had been shop·ping, entered her auto~
mobile which was standing in the street near the sidewalk
facing west. There was a street railway track in the
middle of the street upon which an electric engine was
moving 3 or 4 flat cars in front of it and toward her.
She turned her automobile toward the south and looked
east along the track and saw only 'a black object on
the track, not noticing whether it was moving at that
time. She did not notice the flat cars at all and she had
the idea that whatever the black object was she had an
abundance of time to get across the street. In affirming
the judgment of nonsuit, this court held:
''That contributory negligence bars recovery,
and that a plaintiff, who fails to conform to what
the law requires of him, or to ·do what a ll'erson
of prudence would ordinarily have done under
the same or similar circumstances, is guilty of
negligence, are axioms of the law. * * *
''The plaintiff, however, testified that she
looked, but looked so inattentively or purposelessly that she knew not whether the object seen
by her was a street car or something else. The
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son before attempting· to cross a street -car track
ordinarily was or was not required to look for
approaching cars, or whether he ordinarily would
or would not have done so, but whether a p·rudent
person, in looking, under the circumstances tes~i
fied to by plain tiff, and exercising the care In
that particular that a prudent person ordinarily
would exercise, would so have -conducted or behaved himself that he, under the circumstances
ordinarily would have seen no more than did
plaintiff. We must, and do, assume she looked.
She so testified. * * *
''May reasonable minds differ that such conduct was the ordinary conduct of a p~rudent per-.
son under the circumstances~ We think not. Counsel say that a prudent person in looking as did
the plaintiff might well have seen the electric
engine but not the flat cars, because they were
considerably lower than the object looked at, and
because of the infrequency of flat cars pushed or
drawn along street car tracks. There may be
cases where one may receive impressions by mistaking or misconceiving the facts or objects, or
their ap·pearance, and act on such imp·ressions,
and not he guilty of negligence. But one may also
he guilty of mistaking or misconceiving facts or
objects or app·ea.rances, negligently. Plaintiff's
not seeing the flat cars, and not knowing whether
the black object seen by her was a street car or
something else, or whether it was standing or
mo:ving, ·did not result from such a mistake or
misconception, hut from her conduct in looking
in an objectless and aimless manner, from her
negligent or careless behavior in that regard. Because of that thoughtless and purposeless manner
of looking and of her -careless conduct in that
regard, the flat cars were not seen by her, though
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they "~ere ~plainly visible and almost in her direct path as she undertook to cross the track.''
It cannot be claimed :that some condition unknown
or une:A!)ected to plaintiff caused her to fall. She testified that she SR\Y and observed the condition of the canvas '~just crumpled up and bunched there,'' and stepp·ed
over with her left foot and caught her right foot in it
and fell. The canvas was not hidden nor concealed and
it must be said that plaintiff was negligent as a matter
of law in the manner in which she stepped over it.
In the case of MI(Jmes v. Hitne:s ta;rnd McNair Ro:te·ls,
197 S. W. ( 2d.) 889 ( S. Ct. Tenn. 1946-), the plaintiff
and her husband sought recovery for injuries resulting
from a fall on the slippery floor in the hallway on the
fourth floor of a hotel operated by the defendants. A
wet spot on the floor about six inches in diameter had
been caused by water dripping from an overhead hot
water pipe. Mrs. Manes, a woman of sixty-five years of
age, came out of her ·room and stepped ·on the wet spot
on the floor and fell, suffering a broken hip'. It ap·peared
that she knew about the wet p·lace being there. In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals which had
held that the question of contributory negligence was
for the jury, and in affirming the trial .court which had
sustained a motion for directed verdict for the defendant, the court said:
"It was the duty of Mrs. Manes to exercis·e
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sonable use of. her faculties to avoid danger;
and if she used an unsaf~ way when there was a
safe way for her to travel ·down the hallway, she
would be guilty of want of ordinary care. M emP'his Street R1aiZ.waJy Co. v. Roe, 118 Tenn. 601,
102 .s,. W. 343; Worsham v. D:empster, 148 Tenn.
267, 255 S. W. 52."
''In Amerioarn T1obacco Co. v. Adams, 137
Ky. 414, 125 S. W. 1067, it wa.s held that there
could be no recovery by an employee of the Tobacco Comp·any injured while trucking a load of
tobacco to its warehouse based upon the mere fact
that the roof had leaked and the rain had covered
a certain area of the floor over which he had
traveled where a similar condition had prevailed
several times before to his knowledge, and at
the time in question he was clearly able to see
and ap·p·reciate any danger which might arise
from the condition. ' '

''In Standard Knitti1~g Mills v. Hickmam, 133
Tenn. 43, 46, 179 S. W. 385, 386·, the court said:
'' 'In our op·inion the trial judge and that
·court should have sustained the motion for such
peremptory instructions, on the ground that the
danger was so simp~le and obvious as that the employe coul·d, at a glance observe and comprehend
for herself, and so obvio:us as that it was not incumbent on the emp,loyer to give her warning.
Plaintiff knew that 'the floors were cleaned by
mopp·ing them with soapy water at intervals, and
a:lso the direction the colored woman took, in
doing so, as the latter passed the machine in question.' ''
"The· proof shows without contradiction that
Mrs. Manes knew about this water drip.ping and
standing on the floor. She testified that she knew
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it had existed over a period of many months, and
that she used this hallway 'vhere this water was
standing several times each day. We are of opinion that the conclusion is irresistable that her
contributory negligence bars her recovery as a
matter of law.''
The courts have held that where a dangerous condition exists and another "\Vay could he used with little,
or moderate inconvenience, a person who elects to take
the dangerous way assumes the risks of so doing. When
plaintiff observed the condition of the hallway she had
not one but two other exits available to her. The back
stairway was only 28 feet south from her apartment
door, and with little inconvenience she eould have gone
down the south stairway to the first floor and proceeded
to the front door. ·The east stairway was between her
apartment and the canvas, and she had 5·6 feet of hallway to traverse during wh~ch distance she could observe
the equipment and without any inconvenience turn to
the right and use the east stairway to the main floor
and thence out the front door. Even if she had not seen
the barricade until she was within a few feet of it, shecould have returned a distance of not to exceed 22 feet
and used the east stairway in safety. When p1laintiff ohserved the equipment as it existed and failed to take
one of the courses available to her, she was herself guilty
of negligence and assumed whatever risk there was of
proceeding past the equipment.

In R:aymond v. Union Racific R·ailriOiad Co.,_ Utah
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signee knew that gondola cars were used for carrying
loose material, yet during switching operations he stood
on the platflorm of a gondola car loaded with scrap metal
and grasped the end piece of the car in such a manner
that when p·art of the load shifte·d, his hand was crushed.
In hoiding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law, this court said:
'' The obvious truth, from plain tiff's own
testimony, is that h·e gave no thought to his own
safety. He placed his hand in a position which
he knew to be dangerous, when there was a safe
method open to him. The court below correctly
held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.''
In the case of Whaletn v. UniJon Pac·ific Coal Q.o., 50
Utah 455, 168 Pac. 99, the administrator sought to recover for the death of the deceased resulting from deceased's coming into contact with a highly charged
trolley wire while clmbing into an empty coal car used
to return the men to the outside of mine and called a
"man trip". Deceased stepped on the bumper of the
car instead of boarding from the side and before the
electricity in the overhead trolley wire had been shut
off. He was .attemp~ting to get into the car ahead of
some of his fellow employees in order to get out of the
mine first. In reversing the judgment for the p[aintiff
the court held :
'' The deceased, also, of his own vo'li tion
hoarded the man trip in a way recognized hy th~
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cumstances presumably known to hi1n) to he extremely dangerous and hazardous, instead of
boarding it in the usual and customary way,
"'"hich involved but little, if any, danger. It ap·pears that he did this to avoid the p·rohable inconvenience of \vaiting ten or fifteen minutes after
the man trip arrived at the main slop·e before
being taken out of the mine. He was, therefor~e,
as a matter of la\v, guilty of negligence-negligence that resulted in, and wa.s the p.roximate
cause of, his death. ' '

In Nauma;n v. Central & Lafayette Re~alty C:ompamy,
Inc., 60 A. (2d.) 242 (S. Ct. N. J. 1948), the plaintiff sued
for injuries resulting from slipping on the stairway.
The plaintiff was the advertising manager ·of a tenant
in the building and was required to go from his employer's offices on the fourth floor 't.o those _on the third
floor. He went to the rear stairway which was nearer
and convenient to his office and which he had used, for
his convenience, many times p·rior to the accident. At the
time of his entering into the stairway, the ligbts on the
third and fourth floors and the light on the stairway
were not lighted. Plaintiff walked down the first flight
of steps until he came to a 'landing midway between the
floors, which landing consisted of two sections. The
faint light from a large skylight above made the two
sections of the landing app·ear to be blended into one
and he stepi)·ed off the edge of the first section and fell.
In reversing the judgmen't for the plaintiff and holding
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that the motions for a nonsuit and for ·a directed verdict
should have been granted, the court said:
''The defendant owed the plaintiff the duty
of exercising ordinary eare to make the premises
reasonably saf·e. Assuming, but without deciding, that the defendant breached a duty resting
upon him to artificially light the stairway in question, we are of the opinion that it conclusively
appears that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the
dangers resulting from his use of the stairway
under the circumstances and such being the case
the motions at issue should have been granted.''
"To recover, it was the responsibility of the
p~laintiff to prove by the preponderance of the
evidence that the proximate cause of his injuries
was the failure or lack of lights as that was the
sole and remaining gist of the alleged actionable
negligenee. If that he so, then he assumed to his
knowledge the risk of danger from the very thing
which is the foundation of the eomplaint. Within
his knowledge, there was also available to him
for use an elevator and the front stairway.
CostanZJo v. Prvudent'ial lns11Jrwnce Co., Inc., Sup.
1938, 121 N. J. L. 361, at page 363, 2 A. 2d. 882.
There was janitor S'ervice in the building. The
janitor could have been advised and a correction
made before the descent was undertaken.
''The test is whether an ordinary prudent
person would under the same or similar circumstances have incurred the risk which such conduct
involved. Solomon v. Finer, Sup. 1935, 115 N. J.
L. 404, 180 A. 567; B·ianchi v. South Par.k Presbyteriam ·Church, Err. & App. 1939, 123 N. J. L. 325,
8 A. 2d 567, 12'4 A.L.R. 808. Where it indisputably ap·pears to the contrary, the question is one
of law for the court.''
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The cases of Bitanchi v. South Park P,e:sbyteriwn

Church, 123 N. J. L. 325, 8 A. 2d. 567, and S:olomon v.
Fin.er, 115 N. J. L. 404, 180 A. 567, cited by the court

above, both deal 'vith the use hy plaintiff of unlighted
stairways when the danger could have been avoided.
In the Biarnchi case the court said:
''Reason and justice dictate that one cannot deliberately incur an obvious risk, especially
where 1)ireventive means are at hand, and then
hold the author of the danger for the ensuing
damage. Whether such conduct he classed as an
assumption of risk or contributory negligence,
it precludes recovery. There was no controversy
here as to what plaintiff did or failed to do; and
the evidence was not fairly susceptible of divergent inferences on the question of whether her
conduct met the requirements of due care. It
did not reasonably admit of an affirmative answer
to that inquiry. Plaintiff was sui juris. She indisputably knew and app.reciated the hazard of
injury arising from the special circumstances.
The danger was obvious to one reasonably regardful for his own security. And there was no element of compulsion in what plaintiff did. The
course taken was wholly voluntary; it was in no
sense one of necessity or reasonably to be considered as such by the actor. She did not take
advantage of known available means to insure
her safety. s.he made no effort to ap~prize the
sexton of her p·light, either directly or through
others in ~the building, nor did she secure the aid
of the light in the locker room which the op·ening of the door would have provided. Thus, it
conclusively appears that, fully comprehending
the risk, plaintiff chose to rely upon her ability to
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descend the stairs without mishap·; and in such
circumstances she cannot visit upon the sexton the
.consequences of her falL Comp·are Gleason v.
B~oehrn, 58 N. J. L. 4'75, 34 A. 886, 32 L. R. A. 645;
Saumders v. Sm.ith Rie1alty O~o., 84 N. J. L. 276,
86 A. 404; Rooney v. Siletti, '96· N. J. L. 312, 115
A. 664; Siolomovn v. Fine·r, 115 N. J. L. 404, 180
A. 5i67. The cases of Andre v. Mertens, 88 N.J. L.
626, 96 A. 893, and Roth v. Prot1os, 120 N. J. L.
502, 1 A. 2d. 10, are factually distinguishable.''
In the Solomon cas·e the eourt pointed out that plaintiff proceeded into a dark s:tairway without seeking light
or aid and held as follows :
''Respondent, in these circumstances, was
plainly guilty of culpable negligence. The obligation rested upon him to exercise reasonable care
for his own safety. 'The inquiry is whether fairminded men might honestly differ as to whether
his conduct was such as one exercising ordinary
care and p-rudence would have ipillrsued under
the circumstances. Pesin v. Jugovich, 85 N. J.
Law, 256, 88 A. 1101. And it must, perforce, be
answered in the negative. His ·0onduct was not
the subject of conflicting evidence; nor does the
evidence reasonably permit of divergent inferences res:p,e-cting it. * * *'
''The evidence did not fairly admit of an
inference of reasonable care hy respondent. On
the contrary, it indisputably app'ears that he, by
the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided
the consequences to himself of app·ellant's negligence f.ound by the trial judge. See Gle1asorn v.
Boehm, 58 N. J. Law, 475, 34 A. 886, 32 L. R. A.
645; Saunders v. Smith Realty C1o., 84 N. J. Law,
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~76,

86 ~-\. 404; Egge1"t v. illutu.al
111 N. J. La,v, 502, 168 A. 312.''

G~ocery

Co.,

In the case of Harmo1U!J Realty C1o. v. Underwoo1d,
161 N. E. 92± (S,. Ct. Ohio 1928), plaintiff sought ~to recover for injuries received when she stumbled on loose
stones covering the sidewalk and was thrown upon a
pile of crushed stone lying adjacent thereto. Plaintiff
"~as a tenant in a building owned by the defendant and
was accustomed to using the rear entrance and 'the sidewalk which was in the process of being cemented. Plaintiff testified, as she proceeded along the sidewalk, she
saw the c-rushed stone lying thereon, some as small in
size as a navy bean and some as large a.s an inch in
diameter. In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff
and holding that the trial court erred in refusing to
direct a verdict for the defendant as requested, the court
stated:
''The plaintiff testified to the character of
the place where she slipped and fell. She saw
the stones on the sidewalk; she had actual notice
of the situation, that the defendant did not have,
and, under the circumstances, testified ~to by her,
she assumed the risk of which she now complains;
she attempts to relieve herself of her own lack
·of care by testifying that, upon her return, sh:e
had a basket of provisions in one hand and a
hand bag in the other. While this may have impaired her efforts to successfully pass over ~these
pebbles or ston:es, it did not relieve her from the
exercise of due care, incumbered as she was with
the packages which she carried, especially where
she testified that only a few minutes before she
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obtained full knowledge ·of the conditions affecting the safety of the walk. The ~testimony is undisp·uted that the plaintiff eould have safely entered her apartment by the front instead of the rear
entrance and thereby have avoided the obstruction. She not only voluntarily passed over a place
wher·e the source of danger was plainly visible,
but she had actual notice of it~ attendant risk.
Village of C·onne,aut v. Naef, 54 Ohio St. 529,
44 N. E. 236."
Assumption of risk 1s not limited to master and
s-ervant cases. This is set out by this court in the case of
'Baylor v. Bamberger Electric R. C~o., 62 Utah 552, 220
Pac. 695 (1923). There P'laintiff recovered judgment
against the defendant carrier for injury sustained while
a passenger on defendant's train. Plaintiff was returning from Lagoon to Ogden on Labor Day and boarded
a very crowded car, standing in the· aisle until the train
had reached Layton, about six miles from Lagoon on the
way to Ogden. At Layton, plaintiff and a friend went
through a window in the ear, because of the crowded
condition and smoke in the car, and ran to the rear
of 'the train and got on the steps of one of the open
cars, which steps were also erowded and difficult to hold
on to. During the subsequent ride the train lurched in a
place where there appeared to be some. defect in the
track and plaintiff was thrown from the car and injured. In re¥ersing the judgment for the plaintiff, the
court said:
''As pointed out by this court in K uchen'me:ister v. L. A. & 8. L. R. R. Co., 52 Utah 116
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172 Pac. 725, there is a clear distinction between
contributory negligenee, and assun1ption of risk.
It has, ho,vever, also been held that under certain circtunstances the same acts or conduct may
make one guilty of contributory negligence and
also giYe rise to the defense of assump1tion of
risk.
~'The undisputed facts and circumstances,
according to the authorities to which we shall
hereinafter refer, clearly bring this case within
the doctrine just stated. In view of plaintiff's.
statements, there is not a shadow of doubt that
he acted with full knowledge of all the circumstances surrounding him and that all he did in
the premises was done deliberately and with full
appreciation of the dang.er to which he exp·osed
himself. True, he may not have anticipated the
lurching or swaying of the cars; hence it is contended that because the lurching of the cars was
due to the defendant's negligence plaintiff did not
assume the risk. It no doubt is true that under
ordinary circumstances a passenge-r will not be
held to have assumed a risk arising out of a
carrier's negligence. In this ease, howeve-r, the
circumstances are extraordinary.''
·
N~aumarn

v. ·Cent'ral and Lafayette
Re~alty Compwny, Inc., supra, B·ianchi v. South Park
Presbyteriwn Church, supra, Wilson v. Lai[Jiham Re:al Estlate Company, 175 A. 480 (S. C. & R. I.); Whalen v.
Union Pacific c~oa.l Compawy, sup~ra, all indicate that not
The cases of

only is the defense of contributory negligence available
but also the defense of assumption of risk.
In Costanzo et .al v. Prudootia.l Ins. Co., Inc., 121
N. J. L. 361, 2 A. (2d) 882 (S. Ct. N. J. 1938), the cour.'t
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reversed the judgment for the plaintiff for injuries sustained when he tripped on a broken stairway step in
defendant's building. Plaintiff was ·employed by defendant's tenants as a store clerk and was sent to the
cellar to get some wrapping J:l1aper. ·There were three
s-eparate stairways to the building and plaintiff knew
that the other stairways were available and that the
stairway on which he trip·ped was in bad condition. The
court held:
''We are ·entirely satisfied that, were the
question of negligence alone involved, the trial
judge would have been correct in submitting this
cause to the jury to determine whether defendant breached its duty to use rieasonable care to
keep the stairway in a safe and usable condition.
Roth v. Prot:os, 120 N. J. L. 502, and cases therein
cited on p·age- 504, 1 A. 2d. 10, 11. But the existence of negligence was not the sole issue here.
For, conceding defendant's negligence, we are
equally well satisfied that plaintiff failed to establish a right of recovery, sin0e he clearly assumed what risk there was in using the stairway
in question. By his own admissions it appears
that the broken condition of the steps :prevailed
throughout his entir·e employment of about four
months; and ~that he 'often' used that stairway.
Furthermore, plaintiff himself testified that the
stairway was in 'very had condition' and that he
considered it 'dangerous'. In addition to all this,
and unlike the p·roof in H·etrm.an v. Home Owwers'
Loan Corp10111ation, 120 N. J. L. 437, at foot of
page 440, 200 A. '742, a~t page 744, which was 'that
no other way was available,' the plaintiff here
could have used either of the other two available
stairways the saf·ety of which had not been chalSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lenged. To use the stair,vay he did under these
circumstances 'vas to assume the risk which might
and did result from that use. V olenti non fit inJUria.

··'Ve

perceive nothing which distinguish·es
the instant case from the holdings in Vorr"tath v.
B1trke, 63 N. J. L. 188, 42 A. 838, and Rtooney v.
Siletti, 96 N. J. L. 312, 115 A. 664. Cf. Ra~en
burg v . ..~..4.ugitst, 119 N. J. L. 83, esp~ecially cases
collated on page 87, 194 A. 152, 154. ''
In the case of Birthisel v. Corncord Premium Building & Lo(Jf(t Ass 'n., 343 Pa. 194, 22 A. 2d. 685 ( S. Ct. Pa.
1941), plaintiff, who had been living with her daughter
for several weeks, knew of the defective steps of her
daughter's rented home and although she could have
used another exit with hut slight inconvenience chose to
use the dangerous steps and was injured when one of
the steps broke. The -court held :
''The court below p·roperly ·entered a compulsory nonsuit as the testimony elearly estab-,
lishes that plaintiff 'vas guilty of contributory
negligence in testing a known danger. There was
no necessity for her to leave by the ste~ps which
she knew were in a dangerous condition. ·She
could have used the exit through the cellar with
but slight inconvenience. Having chosen to use
a way subject to risk and danger, when a safe
way was available to her, she must bear the consequences of her ehoice: Levli)t!t v. BIG Swnd!wich
Shop~s, Inc., 294 Pa. 291, 144 A. 71; Boyd v. Kernsitngtion Wa:t.er ~co., 316 P·a. 522, 175 A. 395; Smith
v. Pittsburgh, 338 Pa. 216, 12 A. 2d. 788; V1alente
v. Lindner, 340 Pa. 508, 17 A. 2d. 37l.
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In J oh(YW)ton v. Tounangeau et al, 259 N. W. 187
(S. Ct. Minn. 1935 ), plaintiff tenant tripped on a broom
handle on an unlighted rear stairway. There was an
additional stairway in front, well lighted and well known
by the 1plaintiff. In affirming the verdict directed in
favor of the defendant, the court said:
''If plaintiff was to take th.e risk of walking
in darkness 'feeling his way,' he assumed the risk
of encountering such a common and customarily
used article as a broom. Id. § 7041a. This feature
of defendants' claimed negligence is indeed weak
and unsatisfactory. Be that as it may, the fact
remains that plaintiff chose a route of darkness
rather than one of light. He should not be heard
to complain.''
In C~olburn v. 8hu~avlev, 24 Cal. App. 2d. 298, 74
P. (2d.) 1060 (CaL 1938) (Hearing denied), the plaintiff, a tenant of the defendant, sued to recover damages
for injuries sustained when she tripped over a defective
rug in defendant's apartment and fell. She had removed
the rug from its usual place in the hall and had placed
it on the living room rug for the purpose of cleaning it.
The front door bell rang, she hurried to the door, tripped
on the rug, fell and was injured. Plaintiff had twice
notifi.ed defendant's manager of the defect in the rug
and had been p·romised that it would be repiaired. In
affirming a nonsuit for the defendant the court said:
'' 'In the absence of special warranty or
~greement, the te~ant iJ?- ~aking ~the leased premIses assumes all risks arising from damages which
are obvious to ordinary observation.'
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"It is sufficient to cite in support of the
text Wat·wood v. F~osdick, 212 Cal. 84, 297 P. 881;
Griggs v. Corok, 106 Cal. App·. 551, 289 P. 693;
Ellis v. Jl eNeese, 109 Cal. Ap.p. 667, 293 P. 854;
Priver v. Yowng, ·62 Cal. App1. 405, 216 P. 966, and
r'"an Eve.ry v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563. The purport of
these decisions is that, when a 'tenant voluntarily
remains on leased premises with full knowledge
of their dangerous or defective condition, he assumes all risks which are obvious to ordinary
observation.''
The following cases further support defendant's
position that plaintiff was gui'lty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to observe and app·reciate the condition of the hallway and in failing to pay
attention to the manner in which she stepp·ed over the
canvas and that she was guilty of contributory negligence and assumed the risk in p·roceeding as she did
where other stairways were available for her use: Ward
1:. Clark, 177 S. E. 212 (S. Ct. of Ap·p., Va.); Wilson v.
Lalpham Real Esta;t·e Comparrt;y, 175 A. 480 (S. Ct. R.I.);
Fo111!Jo v. Chioago TitLe ·& Trwst Camp GIYII!J, 16 N. E. 2d.
192 (Ill. Ap·p.); F1abel v. Boehmer Re1alty C~omip'amty, 227
S.W. 858 (Mo.); Wright v. ~ones) 193 So. 197 (La.); ·and
Cutno v. Scrra;nton Medical Arts Building, 198 A .. 141
( S. Ct. Penn.).
1

Under Points I, II and III, defendant has set forth
the failure of plaintiff's ~mended eomplaint to state a
cause of action, the failure of plaintiff's evidence to show
culpable negligence on the part of defendant or his employees, and that plaintiff herself was guilty of conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tributary negligence and had assumed the risk as a
matter of law. Such being the case, it follows that defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been
granted, and likewise defendant's motion for nonsuit,
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
motion for new trial.

POINT IV.

THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN INSTRUC·TING THE JURY ON P'LAINTIFF 'S THEO·RY OF THE CAS~E AS
SET FORTH IN HER PLEADINGS
AND NO·T IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE EVIDENCE, AND IN R.EFUSING
TO. INSTRUCT THE JURY O·N DEFENDAN·T'S THEORY OF THE CASE
AS REQUESTED.

In Instruction No. 4, which will he discussed more in
detail as Point V, the trial court gave p1laintiff's requested Instruction No. 3, as follows :
"You are instructed that it was the duty of
the defendant, L. Jansen, and his employees to
keep the floor of :the hallway on the s:econd floor
of the apartment building reasonably safe for
plaintiff in her us-e of the hallway, and that if the
said defendant in spreading canvas on the floor
or in permitting tools and equipm;ent to be left
and strewn about the hallway in such a manner
as ~to make the hallway dangerous, or not reasonably safe for the p1aintiff in her use thereof then
the said defendant was negligent." (R. 31-2· and
52.)
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In Instruction No. 5 the trial court gave plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 2, as follows:
'"You are instructed that if the defendant,
L. Jansen, and his employees, while performing
their "\York in the hallway on the second floor of
the R,oosevelt Apartments, knew or should have
known that it "\vould not be reasonably safe for
:persons using said hallway to cross over the
canYas or pass their equipment, then it was the
duty of said defendant or his employees either
to block off said hallway where they were working
or to instruct and advise persons using the same
to use the other stairway; and if you find from
the evidence that they failed in this duty and
that by reason thereof plaintiff, while using ordinary care for her own safety, was injured, then
your verdict shall be in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant." (R. 32 and 51.)
In Instruction No. 8 (R. 34) the trial court defined
negligence to the jury and in Instruction No. 10 the
court instructed the jury on the measure of damages.
(R. 34-5). In giving these instructions the court sub...
mitted plaintiff's entire theory of the case to the jury
and instructed the jury on plaintiff's pleadings, which
were not supported by the evidence. The giving of these
instructions was excepted to by defendant (R. 198-200)
and assigned as error in the Statement of Errors 4, 5,
6 and 7.
As discussed under Point I, there was no showing
of negligence on the part of plaintiff, and it was error
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tainly there was no proof that equipment and tools were
"strewn about the hallway." The defendant's evidence
was that they were placed there in an orderly and
systematic manner and this testimony was not disputed
hy il'l~intiff. The equipment was simple and obvious and
was observed hy defendant. When plaintiff saw the very
thing which she claims constituted a hazard, a barricade
or warning as required by Instruction No. 5 could give
plaintiff no more notice than she already had, and to
instruct the jury that the defendant had the duty to
''block off said hallway where they were working or to
instruct and advis-e p·ersons using the same to use the
other stairway" was error.
Even more serious was the court's refusal to instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the case, and its
refusal to give defendant's requested Instructions ·6,
8 and 9, as follows :
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in traversing the hallway of the apartment was not
relieved of the necessity of exercising ordinary
care for her own safety. If you find that the defendant's equipment was placed in the hallway
in such a manner that it constituted a hazard
which plaintiff under the circumstances should
have observed and that p~laintiff, notwithstanding
the fact that other exits were available to her,
proceeded to take 'the hazardous course, then you
must find that she assumed the risk of any injury
which she sustained and your verdict shall be in
favor of the defendant Jansen, no cause of. action.'' (R. 45)
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'~If

you find that the defendant's equipment
"~as placed in the hallw·ay in such a manner that it
constituted a hazard and that plaintiff observed,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should have
observed such hazard, then you are instructed
that plaintiff vvas negligent in not taking either
the east or south stairways which were available
to her and your verdict shall be against the plain~tiff and in favor of the defendant Jansen, no
cause of action." (R. 47)
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in traversing the hallvvay of the apartment is not relieved of the necessity of exercising ordinary care
for her own safety regardless of whether the
equipment of the defendant was so placed in the
hallway that it did or did not constitute a hazard.
Therefore, if you believe from all of the evidence
that plaintiff acte-d in a careless or negligent
manner in passing by or over the equipment and
that such carelessness or negligence resulted in
the injury complained of, your verdict shall be
in favor of the defendant L .. Jan sen, no cause of
action." (R. 48)
·
·
The defendant excepted to the court's refusal to
give these requested instructions (R. 197-8) and has assigned such refusal as e-rror in Statement of Errors 8,
9 and 10. In Instruction No. 6 the court did instruct that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence if she
failed "to keep a lookout for her own safety" or "to
observe the condition which existed in the hallway.'' But
defendant claimed also that if the jury found that a
hazard existed which should have bee·n observed b;y
plaintiff and that she took the hazardous course when
other exits were available to her, she assumed the
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risk (defendant's requested Instruction 6) that if a
hazard existed that should have been observed by plaintiff, then she was negligent in not taking either the east
or south stairways which were available to her (def.enddant's requested Instruction 8) and that the plaintiff
was negligent in the manner in which she stepped over
the.eanvas (defendant's requested Instruction 9).
;This court has held in the case of Pratt v. Vtlah LighJt

and Traction ~Co., 57 Utah 7, 16.g Pac. 868, that .a defin!ition of contributory negligence as want of ordinary care,
though abstractly correct, should he specifically app,lied
to the circumstances of the case. In its opinion the court
said:
"Each p·arty to a suit is entitled to have his
theory, when there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury
on the facts tending to suppor:t such theory, assuming a;lways that there is testimony offered to
sup·port the same, and this court has so held in
Hartley v. Salt Lake: City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pac.
522, where, s:peaking through Straup, J., iit is said:
'' ' There are two parties to a lawsuit.
Each, on a submission of the ease to the jury,
is entitled to a submission of it on his theory
and the law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as to the cause of the accident
is embodied in the p·roposed requests. There·
is some e~dence, as we have shown, to render
them appl1cahle to the eas:e. That is not disp·uted. We think the court's refusal to charge
substantially as requested was error. That
the ruling was prejudicial and works a reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Yersal of the judgment
lmavoidable.' ''

IS

self-:evident and

In the ease at bar the trial court defined contributory negligence generally and gave defendant's requested instruc.tion on c.ontributory negligenc.e as applied
to her failure to keep a lookout for her own safety and
to observe the condition in the hallway (Instruction 6),
but the c.ourt in refusing to give defendant's requested
Instructions 6, 8 and 9 failed to instruct the jury on def.endant's theory that plaintiff was also negligent in not
taking the east or south stairway, that she was negligent
in the manner in which she stepped and that she assumed
the risk of the danger of which she -complains. There
was evidence to support defendant's claim that plaintiff
·proc.eeded negligently. She testified that she saw the
·condition of the canvas, step·ped over it with her left
foot and caught her right he·el in it. The defendant was
entitled to have the jury instructed on contributory negligence as it app[ied to the manner in which plaintiff
stepped and defendant's requested Instruction 9 should
have been given. Plaintiff testified that she observed the
condition of the equipment in the hallway and she knew
that the east and south stairways were available for
her use. The defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on contributory negligence and assumption of
risk as app·lied to plaintiff's failure to use one of the
other ways which were available to her as requested
by defendant's requested Instructions 6 and 8.
In Morga;n v. Bimgham St;age Lines C-o., 75 Utah 87,
283 Pac. 160, the trial court instructed the jury on the
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contributory negligence of the deceased, O-rson Morgan,
as follows:
'' 'You are instructed that contributory negligence is the failure to use that ordinary care and
diligence that would be expected of an ordinary
prudent p·erson ·of similar age and experience
to that of the deceased, Orson Morgan, under
like circumstances to avoid an injury. Therefore,
even though you find that the def·endants were
negligent, still, if you find that the deceased, Orson Morgan, did not exercise that ordinary care
and diligence to prevent injury 'to himself that
would he expected of ordinary and ·prudent persons of similar age and exp·erience situated as
Orson Morgan was, you should find for the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of
action.' ''
After quoting the rule laid down by Justice Straup in
Rart.Zey v. Salt Lake City, su~pra, the court said and held:
"Respondent's couns:el apparently do not
contest this rule of law, hut they argue these requests were substantially covered, as the court
found was the case in the cases cited. The court
in other instructions set forth fully plaintiff's
rtheory of the evidence as to the alleged negligence
on the part of the defendants, hut, except as
pointed out, gave no instructions on defendants'
theory.
''While the requests are not models of accuracy, we think the defendants were :entitled 'to
have at least the substance of the same given so
as to pTesent their theory of the evidence to the
jury, and that a failure on the part of the c.ourt
to do so was prejudicial error.''
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In .A.nde.rson v. Niels:ovn, et al, 43 Utah 564, 137 Pac.
152, the trial court submitted plaintiff's theory of the·
case to the jury and ·submitted one of defendant's theories of the cause of the accident but failed to instruct
on an additional theory requested by defendant. In reversing the judgment of the trial court and granting a
new trial the court said :
''The defendant requested a submission of
the case on the theory that he was not responsible
for the piremature releasing of the snubbing rope-,
if the order given by him was directed to the
man at :the rear tackle but was misunderstood by
the men at the snubbing rope, and that rope prematurely released because of such misunderstanding or mistake, as did the plaintiff on the theory
that the defendant was. responsible if the order
given hy him was dir.ected and given to ~the men
at the snubbing post. The court submitted the
case on both such theories. The defendant, in
addition, also requested the court to submit the
case on the ~theory that the failure of the man
to release the rop·e at the rear tackle, and who had
been commanded to release it, was the cause of the
accident. The court refused that request, and did
not submit the case upon such theory. The court
erred in ~that. * * * ''
There is a clear distinction between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. This distinction has
been recognized by this -court.
In the case of Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S. L.
R. 'C·o., 52 Utah 116, 172 Pac. 725 ·(1918), the plaintjff was
injured while employed in defendant's roundhouse and
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machine shop while engaged in repairing a passenger
engine and using an emery wheel to grind down a pin.
A small piece of steel or other hard substance was thrown
off from said emery wheel which entered his eye and
resulted in the eyeball being removed. The court discussed the two defenses as follows :
''Assuming however, for the purpose of this
decision, that the jury found that plaintiff's conduct at the time of the. injury was negligent, and
hence found him guilty of contributory negligence
in that regard, yet it does not necessarily follow
that counsel's contention that plaintiff assumed
the risk should prevail. The defenses of assumed
risk and contributory negligence are entirely independent, and in case there is a conflict in the
evidence, or where the facts are such that reasonable men may legitimately draw different conclusions from the evidence, or may arrive at different conclusions, it cannot be determined as a
matter of law that either the one or the other
defens-e is established, and 'the jury may therefore find that one of the defenses was ·established
and may also find that the other was not. While
in some of the cases there is some confusion res:piecting the distinction between the two defenses,
yet, as a general rule, 'the courts have found little
difficulty in enforcing the true distinction. The
distinction is, perhaps, as well and clearly stated
in a few words as that can he done in the case of
Thomas v. Quartermaine, in L. R. 18, Q. B. Div.
at page 697, where, in discussing the distinction,
it is said:
" 'But 'the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (assumed risk) stands outside the defense of contributory negligence and is in
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no \Yay limited by it. In individual instances
the t\YO ideas sometimes se·em to cover the
same ground, b·ut ca.relessness is not the same
t king as i.ntellig·ent choice.' '· (Italics ours.)

POINT \ 1 • THE TRlA_L COURT ERRED IN GIVIKG INSTRUCTION NO. 4 AND IN INSTRUCTING THE: JURY O·RALLY AND
THEN S.TRIKING A PART THEREOF
FRO~I THE WRITTEN INSTRUCTION.
The trial court ·orally gave rto the jury plaintiff's
requested instruction No. 3 as follows :
"You are instructed that it was the duty
of the defendant L. Jansen, and his employees to
keep the floor of the hallway on the second floor
of the apartment building reasonably safe for
plaintiff in h·er use of the hallway, and that if
the said defendant in spreading canvas on the
floor or in permitting tools and equipment to be
left and strewn about the hallway in such a
manner as to make the hallway dangerous, or not
reasonably safe for the plaintiff in h·er US'e thereof, then the said defendant was negligent, ·and rif
you fimd that in exercising Drdmary cra,re fior
her own safety, plaintiff w~as i·njured by the ·negligence of the defendJant, if you fond tlvat the defendant w·as negligent, then your ve.rdict should
be for the plaintiff amd .agaifnst the defendarnt
Jansen.''
After the court had given the instruction orally, he
struck from the written instruction that part which is
italicized. Defendant ex:cepted to the giving of InstrucSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion No. 4 and particularly to the court orally instructing the jury in the language italicized above. (R.. 198-9)
The court offered to recall the jury and reread Instruetion No. 4 to them but thought that to do so would give
'
emphasis to the instruction. The court did not offer to
change Instruction No. 4 and the def·endant has assigned
as error both the giving of written Instruction No. 4 and
the reading of that part which was striken. (Statement
of Error 5)
.

In giving Instruction No. 4, the court in effeet instructed the jury that defendant Jansen was guilty of
negligence. The -court said ''that if the said defendant
in sprBading the oam;pas on the fZo~r or im p~ermi~ting
the tools (})'Ybd ~equipment to be ~eft amd strewn about the
hallwoi!J in such a maxnmer as t~o make the hal!Jw.ay ·d(J/yt,gerous 10r 1'/)0it re,asonably s~afe fior the pZaJ.intiff in he.r use
thereof, then the defendant was negligent. A careful
reading of the instruction shows that there was nothing
left for the jury to determine. The court has in effect
stated that it is undisputed that the canvas was spread
in such a manner as to make the hallway dangerous and
not reasonably safe for the p:laintiff and that the tools
and equipment were permitted to be left and strewn
about the hallway in such a manner as to make the hallway dangerous and not reasonably safe for plaintiff.
A . similar situation was before this court in W~ebb v.
Snow, et ~al. 102 Utah 435, 132 P. (2d) 114, which involved
an ~lleged assault ·and battery against plaintiff. There
was a dispute in the testimony as to whether plaintiff was
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''lmocked to tthe floor," 'vhether she was "rendered unconscious,·' "'""hether she ''suffered a miscarriage,'' and
as to the force with which she was struck. The court
instructed the jury as follows:
''The eourt instructs you that if you believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff was ·p~regnant
at the time she was rendered 'wncons~cious by the.
blow delivered by one of the defendants' employes, and as a result of said blow and being
lmocked to the floor she suffered a miscarriage
and thereby the loss of her unborn child, you may
award her money damages for the Zoss of said
·unb·o·rn child.'' (Italics added.)
In reversing the judgment of the lower court and
holding the instruction to be
said:

~prejudicial

error, the court

"The foregoing instruction .disregarded entirely the fact that there was considerable dispute
and conflict in the evidence. The instruction,
standing alone, would amount to an .instruction
to find in favor of the plaintiff if 'the jury found
that plaintiff was p·regnant at the time she was
struck, and if they also found that a miscarriage
resulted. The instruction assumes that defendants' employees were to blame for what occurred,
and that the evidence was uncontradicted as to
the following: ( 1) That plaintiff was 'rendered
unconscious' by the 'blow,' and (2) that she was
knocked to the floor. The instruction is so worded
that it indicated to the jury a belief on the part
of the court that defendants' employees were
blameworthy irrespective of the acts of plaintiff.
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As stated in St~ate v. S·eymovwr, 49 Utah 285, 163
P. 789, 792:
'' 'Courts, in charging jurors, should be
very careful not ~to assume any material fact
or facts. Jurors, who are laymen, are always eager to follow the opinion or judgment
of the cou.rt, and if the court assumes any ma. terial fact in the charge, the jurors are most
likely to follow the assumptions of the court.
Indeed, we must assume that such is the
case unless the record clearly shows the contrary.'
''The foregoing statement was quoted with
approval in Sbate v. Homxma, 81 Utah 583, 21 P.
2d. 537, at page 540. While both were criminal
cases, the principle announced therein applies
with ·equal force to jury trials in civil eases. The
court must not resolve ·conflicts in evidence for the
jurors or indicate what particular testimony the
trial court believes correctly states the facts.
* * * "
In requesting the court to give Instruction No. 4,
plaintiff led the court into error. The first part of the
Instruction as it was read to the court entirely disregarded the fact that there was a dispute in the evidence
and assumed that the evidence was uncontradicted as to
the defendant's spreading the canvas and permitting
the tools and equipment to be left and strewn about the
hallway in such a manner as to make it dangerous. That
part of the instruction standing alone amounted to an
instruction to find the defendant negligent, and it stood
alone when the court struck the part italicized above
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from the 'Yritten instruction. The court's striking the
last part of the instruction as it "'"as given orally left
the erroneous part standing alone and exaggerated its
importance in the minds of the jury.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff in this case was fully aware of the
condition of which she complains. She testified that she
knew the defendant Jansen and his men were working
in the hallway and that she saw the ~paper hanger's
table, the paste bucket and the canvas. She knew that
the east and south stairways were available for her use
and that without any inconvenience she could have
walked down either stairway to the main floor and out
the front door. She testified that she observed the condition of the canvas, bunched and uneven, and stepp·ed
over it with her left foot and caug~t her right heel in
it. Plaintiff complains that a hazard was created by
defendant and that she was not warned of its existence, yet the fact is undisp·uted that defendant's equipment was open and obvious and that plaintiff fully observed the situation of which she complains. The facts
as applied to the law make it clear that plaintiff's ·own
negligence in stepping as she did caused her to fall
and that as a matter of law she was herself guilty of
negligence and assumed the risk of proceeding as she
did when other stairways were available to her. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52
defendant's motion for nonsuit should have been grant·ed, and likewise, in order, his motion for directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for
new trial. Other errors occurring in the trial of the case
P'reven'ted defendant Jansen from having a fair tria~
and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY &NEBEKER,
GRAN'T C. A·ADNESEN

Attorneys for Appel"tamt
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